Brexit by Munoz-Dardé, V
 
Brexit for Philosophers’ Magazine 
 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the referendum campaign was the way in which the abstract 
words ‘sovereignty’ and ‘control’ seemed to capture the imagination of voters, enticing them to 
leave aside rather more urgent, concrete, practical concerns. Of course such words can be used 
as a decorous cover for less abstract, but more impolite, sentiments: one might talk loftily of 
sovereignty and control but be inwardly moved by dislike of people with strange accents and 
skin colours, with different and suspicious religions or cultural traditions. Moreover, not 
everyone who voted to leave the EU appealed to these notions or even wanted the result they 
voted for. It is an oft remarked puzzle of democracy that a majority vote can lead to an outcome 
to which most are opposed. A vote for the winning option can be motivated by a diverse range 
of considerations, not necessarily a simple endorsement. Some vote in protest, expressing their 
loathing of current government policies. Others may vote tactically to express support for what 
they anticipated would be the losing option. Grant all of this diversity, still it is remarkable that 
quite so many among the large number of people who made the effort to vote on a day of 
torrential rain were moved by these abstract ideas. These people were willing to endanger, and 
in fact many called for, a near revolution of existing institutional arrangements with the 
inherent economic and political risks that that involves. That an electorate might be so moved 
by abstract ideals seems quite at odds with that oft-repeated self-conception of the British 
people as empirically grounded, pragmatic and practical. 
 
Abstract thought and concepts are central to understanding the political, of course. Practical 
questions of governance must be guided by theoretical and reflective thought. The argument 
for this is perhaps best formulated by Immanuel Kant in a famous essay, ‘On the common 
saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice’. But as Kant recognized, 
and those who love to employ the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory commonly 
miss: theory and reflection can play their proper role only if they are tightly connected to 
knowledge of the practical problems at hand. In the case of the EU referendum, the abstract 
concepts invoked were not at all well matched to the realities that would follow from the 
decision to be made. 
 
What, then, is sovereignty? The idea brings to mind notions of territoriality, membership of a 
nation, the authority to decide. But I can’t recall any positive definition laid out of what 
sovereignty was on offer, or how it had been compromised. What is it for people who live in 
the different constituent parts of the UK to enjoy sovereignty? Sovereignty over what? The 
clearest sense one had of an answer to these questions came negatively through the sense of 
rejection involved in the vote to leave the EU. The least well-off in social and regional terms 
echoed the thought that they had no control over their lives, and so no sovereignty, the idea of 
territory being reintroduced through abstract nostalgia for a better, more socially integrated 
British past – one which may never have existed. 
 
Why was the EU taken to be the culprit in this complaint of an undefined sense of sovereignty 
which had somehow been denied us? In part, those on the right in the UK have long used the 
term ‘Europe’ to designate with a mix of defiance and disapproval all that which lies to the East 
of British borders. (Much as in Franco’s Spain, ‘Europe’ was used to mean that uncleanliness 
North of the Pyrenees.) The fact that these islands have not been invaded in a thousand years 
and the absence of any experience in the population of a split between resistance and 
cooperation with an invading enemy that much of the rest of Europe suffered in the Second 
World War together gave rise to a sense of difference and superiority. Where the rest of the 
European nations have gone in for various forms of soul searching over the last seventy years, 
the UK is fed with a vague sense of national pride, superiority and the proper isolation of a 
British culture. But these feelings of hostility do not arise solely from the right or from 
nationalism. More recently, the brutal treatment of Greece, where the relief of actual, acute 
suffering was sacrificed to vague and abstract financial imperatives, intensified the impression 
that the EU was dogmatically focused on the ideology of free markets, and that it turned its 
back on any concern with people’s control over their own lives. For part of the left, it was a 
short step to thinking, now from the perspective of the least well-off, that we must exit the EU. 
The liberal left and the libertarian right alike viewed rulings ‘from Brussels’ as a denial of our 
self-governance. 
 
What has been less remarked upon, even on the left, are two central facts. First, the nature of 
bureaucracy. And of course there are good reasons to resist and reject the kind of management 
of local practices whose meaning and significance is clear to those nearby, but which are 
sacrificed to concerns of efficiency and the greater good by remote and authoritarian central 
control. However, it is equally clear that we are faced with complex and intertwined social 
orders which rely on the correct operation of various complex social institutions. For our lives 
to go well, we need to treasure the body of very able, highly trained, officials and civil servants 
who help these complex social orders to survive. To cite only British examples, consider the 
large body of public-spirited individuals who work in the NHS, in the BBC, in the corridors of 
Westminster, in local authorities, in the Inland Revenue and the Foreign Office. We must move 
beyond a purely negative attitude towards how the complexity of a globally, inter-connected 
world is sustained by these workers. 
 
Second, it needs to be recognized more widely that for many of the politicians responsible for 
the initial steps and the later evolution of the European Union the main aims were not any 
ideology of the free market. Rather these founders had commitments to peace, to solidarity 
among different peoples, different regions and different social classes. Their commitments 
were to freedom of movement and to proper controls over markets in order to make them work 
more rationally as good instruments to help further people’s lives, rather than to be ends in 
themselves. Solidarity and freedom of movement are abstract notions, no less than sovereignty 
and control. But these have left concrete traces on people’s lives. Their claim on us was reflected 
in the emotional sense of loss so many have felt in the decision to depart from the EU. 
Solidarity, feeling ourselves part of a larger grouping, and a freedom of movement to explore 
these other areas are key aspects of the lives of many in this country. Though the current debate, 
or rather rage, around immigration would seem to deny it, the benefits from this are most 
important for the least well-off. Solidarity and freedom of movement is what the left ought to 
stress a commitment to, and to have a better understanding of how they are central to a 
conception of the good in living together. It is among the greatest of things that the institutional 
arrangements such as the EU have provided us with, and it is now of the greatest of urgency 
that we find other such institutional aids, if the work of the last forty-three years is to be thrown 
away. 
